It should be mentioned, although I don’t discuss it much (mostly to obscure my neolib/center-right leanings), Instapundit is probably my favorite, most-frequented blog. I agree with a shockingly large portion of Glenn Reynolds’ ideas and thoughts, particularly regarding foreign policy and civil liberties, but something he posted recently on the Georgia conflict (after graciously posting my little commentary some days earlier) is making me quite fatigued with disbelief.
Besides a well-thought excerpt from Professor Kenneth Anderson on a freakishly Kremlin-sounding New York Times piece on the Russo-Georgian conflict (probably the diametric opposite of William Kristol’s excellent commentary), Reynolds breaks into some commentary of his own as an update, probably due to an avalanche (reverse instalanche?) of disbelieving readership in his inbox.
UPDATE: Okay, I don’t like the Russian invasion of Georgia, and I very much hope that it turns out badly for Putin and his satraps. But in light of people calling for massive U.S. action, it’s worth noting that there isn’t — and never has been — very much that we can do. Look at Georgia on a map, and you’ll see that there’s no easy way to get troops in except by air even if we wanted to, and we can’t fight a war against the Russian Army with only air supply. At any rate, a shooting war with the world’s second biggest nuclear power seems bad — I don’t think we’d have done it even if Georgia had been admitted to NATO, though it’s possible that would have deterred this. If it hadn’t deterred it, though, it would have left NATO in a pretty pickle: Betray the alliance’s key purpose, or . . . start a shooting war with the world’s second biggest nuclear power, over Georgia.
Well, I take issue with several of Reynolds’ assertions here, even if I can certainly understand the sentiment. First, no one does lift and logistics like the US military. We were able to bring home substantial numbers of Georgian troops home (their finest, which may help explain Russian reticence to push into Tbilisi) very quickly from Iraq (where we continue to draw down troops anyway). It can be done.
Also, the claim that the United States would have had to commit troops on the ground is questionable by itself. I maintain, and I sort of yelled this to anyone who would listen during the last few days, that a more muscular American response didn’t necessarily mean committing 100,000 GIs on the ground. I am convinced, and remain convinced, that the Georgian military was broken in large part because of the overwhelming air superiority of the Russians in-theater. The Georgian army, particularly the US-trained Iraq contingent (which, notably, did not see action), is probably qualitatively at least on-par with the famously creaky Russian forces. However, with very little to defend their airspace, Russia had free rein to bring in paratroopers, bomb critical logistical targets (like radar and military bases) and bomb economic and civilian targets to cripple morale, not to mention direct attacks against Georgian army positions.
The Georgian army was one designed for high-intensity counterinsurgency – as would be seen in places like Iraq or the conflict zones – but not to defend against a premeditated, well-coordinated, high-tempo assault from a country like Russia (or else they would have put more emphasis on local air superiority). Bearing this in mind, a couple of squadrons of US fighters – which could have easily been transferred from bases in Germany, Turkey, or even Northern Iraq – could have seriously turned the tide in several ways. First, the Russians would have thought twice about continuing their offensive if the West demonstrated its seriousness; second, Russian air elements would not have stood a fair chance against high-tech, well-trained US fighters; third, Russian strategic bombing sorties would have had to be far more limited to avoid detection and destruction as they are vulnerable to fighters.
Most of all, however, I think the gesture of moving some squadrons to Georgia or bringing F-22s to theater (that’s what they’re for, right?) would have made such a statement that would have forced the Russians to back down. After taking South Ossetia, they had achieved their stated goals and could have backed down while saving face; Russia certainly doesn’t want a war with the West, especially given the enormity of Western investment in their country.
Even more fundamentally: Georgia absolutely deserved our help. As a country that had contributed so much (especially relative to its national and military population sizes) to US efforts in Iraq and represents a huge amount of strategic and symbolic importance in that part of the world, Russia should not have been permitted to do what it did. It’s just about energy pipelines or ‘entangling alliances’ or even Russian aggression, but what really separates the cold brutality of Putin’s Russia from a supposed commitment to democracy and the rule of law in the West.
I fail to see how the Clinton administration can be right to move two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan straits in 1996 and the Bush administration claim so vehemently that the US will defend Israel when fulfilling our very obvious obligations to tiny, extremely important Georgia is somehow wrong.
Jerry Pournelle claims that going to war with Russia would be ‘egregiously stupid;’ really? The Russians most assuredly know that too about going to war with the West. The cynical view that Georgia doesn’t matter is not only wrong, but dangerously so as it jeopardizes American interests all over the world. You want to talk realpolitik? How about a quick and dramatic fall of pro-American regimes and policies around the world as we shrug off aggression against allies? How about the realization from other powers like Poland and the Ukraine that US patronage is worthless? How about emboldening a bevy of autocrats around the world, confident that the US has no stomach for intervention?
I’ve stated before that the Russo-Georgian conflict may very well have officiated the West’s decline. It still doesn’t have to be this way: bring Georgia (and Ukraine) into NATO immediately. Bring a squadron of F-22s to patrol Georgian airspace (since they’re not doing anything anyway). Make it clear that we will NOT allow this kind of aggression to happen again and that we’re serious about stopping it.
Are we really glad Georgia isn’t in NATO? If so, what’s the point of NATO? Wasn’t its purpose to prevent Soviet Russian aggression against member states? Isn’t it ironic that during a time that NATO is desperately searching for a post-Cold War role that containing Russian imperialism is dismissed out of hand?
1 Comment
August 12, 2008 at 9:42 pm
I feel terrible for the Georgians, but slow down, sure some air units may help but then you are actively fighting Russia, so We are tied down in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel may at any moment attack Iran (have Israel send planes to Georgia?) and all this is going on and North Korea will sit by and China also we would hope and can’t we try talking to Russia, I don’t think anyone bothers to study Russian History, they want under the planned EU/ NATO missile shield, use that carrot for all it’s worth we are overextended. I really think they just feel shut out of Europe, so what the hell, try grabbing some empire again, it’s simplistic but true they are paranoid and over reacting and need calming?